No text has been this much
awaited since the last installment of Harry Potter (which, incidentally, was
referenced to by the principal legal defender of the Philippine Government in
what must be the most controversial election case of decade). The manuscript,
which rivals the thickness of Javellana
v. Executive Secretary and La Bugal-B’laan
v. DENR, concerns a foundling named Poe (no, this is not about a
black-and-white, slightly obese, kung fu-fighting bear from China who was
destined to become dragon warrior), and her bid for the highest position in the
land.
It is interesting to note that in
addition to the 47-page main decision of Poe-Llamanzares
v. COMELEC, the other justices felt it necessary to write their own lengthy,
separate concurring and dissenting opinions. This divided court reveals the
complexity of the issues involved, and the difficulty of arriving at a
decision. Indeed, the implications that would result from this decision would
vastly affect not only the meaning of citizenship and the treatment of
foundlings, but also the powers of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and
the conduct of elections in the country.
The case involves two
consolidated petitions assailing the resolutions of the COMELEC granting the
petitions of Estrella Elamparo (Estrella) and Francisco Tatad (Tatad), et al.
for the cancellation of Poe’s certificate of candidacy. The Elamparo petition
argued that (1) foundlings are not natural-born Filipinos, and assuming
arguendo that they are, the reacquisition of citizenship through RA 9225 does
not reestablish such status; that (2) even if through RA 9225 Poe becomes a
natural-born Filipino, she still falls short of the residency requirement as
her residency should only be counted from July 2006 when she reacquired
Philippine citizenship under the said Act. On the other hand, the Tatad
petition follows a similar logic, arguing that since the Philippines follows
the principle of jus sanguinis,
foundlings cannot be considered natural-born Filipinos because of their unknown
parentage; blood-relationship is what determines the natural-born status. The
Tatad petition goes on to explain that Poe cannot rely on international law to
confer upon her the natural-born citizenship status since international law
requires domestic legislation, and there exists no domestic law which governs
such conferment. On the reacquisition of citizenship through RA 9225, Tatad
contends that the reacquisition of the status of natural-born is only
applicable to natural-born citizens; at most, Poe is a naturalized citizen. Agreeing with Elamparo, Tatad also maintains
that Poe only acquired her domicile in Quezon City only from the time she renounced
her American citizenship which was sometime in 2010 or 2011.
In a nutshell, the case revolves
around the following issues— (1) whether foundlings are considered natural-born
Filipinos, and (2) whether Poe has satisfied the residency requirement (What is
the reckoning point in determining residency?). Another correlated issue which
is of equal importance is the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. Can the COMELEC rule
on the eligibility of a presidential candidate? For the purpose of this blog
entry, the discussion of the issues will only make reference to the main
decision, the dissent of Justice Carpio, and the concurring opinion of Justice Jardeleza.
The writer concedes that a richer analysis of the case may be had had she been
able to read all the opinions.
On the first issue, the 1935
Constitution (the applicable law in Poe’s case) identifies who are Filipino
citizens—
Article IV-Citizenship
Section 1. The following are
citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of
the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
2. Those born in the
Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
3. Those whose fathers are
citizens of the Philippines.
4. Those whose mothers are
citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship.
5. Those who are naturalized
in accordance with law.
The silence of the 1935
Constitution on the status of foundlings led the Court to look at the intent of
the framers of the constitution. On one hand, the main decision, siding with
the Solicitor General, contends that the reason for non-inclusion of foundlings
was “not because there was any objection to the notion that persons of ‘unknown
parentage’ are not citizens but only because their number was not enough to
merit specific mention.” Justice Perez also pointed to the discussion of the
framers where the latter acknowledge the existence of international law that
governs the treatment of the nationality of foundlings. In other words, the
silence of the constitution is not for the purpose of excluding foundlings, but
for the avoidance of redundancy. On the other hand, the legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius was
invoked in ruling against Poe. Justice Carpio in his dissent staunchly
maintained that the framers of the 1935 Constitution categorically rejected the
proposal to include foundlings as citizens of the Philippines in a vote. To
Justice Carpio, this rejection is more indicative of the framers’ intent.
The writer is more inclined to
take Justice Jardeleza’s take on the issue. I agree with the esteemed justice “that
the exact reason why the Convention
voted down Sr. Rafols' proposal to explicitly include ‘children of unknown
parent’ may never fully be settled.” What is clear, however, that there is no
intent to make foundlings stateless, and consequently deprive them of rights
that citizenship entails. I am of the belief that the constitution, whether is
it the 1935 or 1987 Constitution, is (or at least should be) a living
constitution whose interpretation should be geared towards the attainment of
justice and the protection of human rights. As the Solicitor General pointed
out, “foundlings are a ‘discrete and insular’ minority who are entitled to
utmost protection against unreasonable discrimination applying the strict
scrutiny standard.” As Justice Jardeleza explains, it becomes the burden of
government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such
interest.
But assuming arguendo that the
text of the constitution is to be strictly adhered to, the evidence on Poe’s
parentage is convincing. If blood-relation is the basis for a natural-born
status, Poe should be considered a natural-born. Justice Jardeleza points out
that the standard of proof of absolute certainty that the COMELEC has imposed
on Poe is unfair as jus sanguinis is
a principle of nationality, and not a rule of evidence. I subscribe to the
argument that the high probability (at least 99% chance) of her being of
Filipino parentage should suffice.
On the issue of Poe’s residency,
although I agree with main decision that the fact and not the statement
of residence should be controlling, I argue that the reckoning point must be
after the acquisition of citizenship and the renunciation of the foreign one. I
concur with the Elamparo-Tatad petitions that while Poe may have established animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi, she was still an
American citizen at that time and was governed by immigration laws. The Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC case does
not apply as Marcos was already a Filipino citizen at that time. There was no
change in citizenship.
As to the third issue, it would
seem to me that the Court has taken the power to determine the eligibility of
candidates to run for office from the COMELEC. I stand with Justice Carpio that
this could become a dangerous precedent that could totally cripple the COMELEC.
Justice Carpio says that the COMELEC has the power to determine nuisance
candidates for practical reasons, i.e. for the efficient conduct of the
elections. This is why I found it odd that the majority of the Court ruled that
the issuance of certificates of candidacy is a ministerial duty, that the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction in declaring that there are material falsehoods or
misrepresentation in a candidate’s application. The Court tried to justify this
by nuancing ‘disqualification’ from ‘ineligibility’, which to me are mere
semantics.
To conclude, while I applaud the
Court’s efforts to keep the country from turning into the House of Slytherin
who view those that are not “pure-bloods” as inferior, it should take caution
in emasculating government departments. The long term effects of this may not
be worth the search for the country’s dragon warrior.
